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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DECISIONS OF
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
by John P. Spitals*
Introduction
The tremendous importance of systems of protection for intel-
lectual property, such as patents, trademarks and copyrights, to the
economic systems of most nations is scarcely to be questioned. The
Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community in-
cluded specific provisions ostensibly designed for the preservation of
municipal legislation in this area. As has been seen to be the case in
many areas, the Treaty did not establish details; authority to work
out the finer points of Community law was left to the Council and
the Commission.
In a series of nine cases, the European Court of Justice has con-
fronted the "conflict" between guarantees of respect for municipal
systems of intellectual property protection and other provisions of
the Treaty, in particular those relating to the free movement of
goods and the protection of competition. In these confrontations, a
body of Community law has been developed which is arguably incon-
sistent both with the Treaty as a whole and internally as well.
This paper will attempt to point out some of these inconsisten-
cies. After a brief analysis of the factual situation presented, each of
* B.S. 1975, Brown University; J.D. expected 1980, New York Law
School. Mr. Spitals is an Alfred P. Gross Fellow at New York Law School.
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the cases will be scrutinized with reference both to the Treaty and to
earlier decisions. In a concluding section, a few broad generalizations
will be proposed.
Etablissements Consten and Grundig-Verkaufs GmbH v. EEC
Commission 1
Under an exclusive distributorship agreement with Grundig, a
German manufacturer of radios and televisions, Consten was granted
sales rights in France, Corsica and the Saar territory. Consten under-
took, inter alia, to refrain from selling competing products or out-
side its sales territory. Grundig in turn would not deliver its merchan-
dise to any other distributors in Consten's market territory. In addi-
tion, Consten was allowed to register the trademark "GINT"
(Grundig International) in France. The mark was "intended to be at-
tached only to the equipment manufactured by the German Grundig
firm"; Consten agreed to transfer the trademark rights to Grundig or
to cancel the registration if it were to lose exclusive representative
status.2 Identification of the source of the goods throughout Europe
was primarily through use of the "GRUNDIG" trademark- "GINT"
was apparently employed solely to prevent parallel imports.
The French firm U.N.E.F. purchased Grundig products from
German wholesalers and began to import them for sale in Consten's
market territory; Consten, relying on the "GINT" mark, brought suit
against U.N.E.F. on unfair competition and trademark infringement
grounds. Proceedings4 in the French courts were stayed when
U.N.E.F. petitioned the Commission to declare the Consten-Grundig
agreement contrary to the Treat of Rome under the authority dele-
gated to it by Regulation 17/62.
1. [1966] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 429, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder]
COMM. MKT. Rep. (CCH) 8161, Cases 56/64 and 58/64 (hereinafter cited as
Consten v. Commission).
2. [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8161 at
7621.
3. Id.
4. A similar case was pending against the French firm, Leissner; the
litigation was also held in abeyance until resolution of the Commission's conflict
with Grundig and Consten.
5. Regulation No. 17, (1962) J. 0. Comm. E uR. 204. Upon registration
of an agreement not exempted by specific provisions of the regulations, the
Commission could first decide that on the basis of the facts presented, no
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The Commission determined that both the distribution agree-
ment and the terms of the trademark registration were prohibited by
Article 85(1) of the Treaty. The parties were required to refrain
from obstructing parallel imports;6 further prosecution of U.N.E.F.
was thus prevented. The Commission's decision was appealed under
Article 173 of the Treaty. 7
On appeal, Grundig et al.8 argued that the Commission had in-
correctly considered effects on competition between Grundig dis-
tributors in determining whether there had been a Treaty violation.
Far from being limited to products of a single brand, the plaintiffs
and the intervening German government asserted that the proper
scope of examination in any determination of restriction on compe-
tition was the market for similar goods of different brands.9 A con-
sideration of actual effects on the market as a whole was a prerequi-
site to a finding of restraint of trade in his conclusions, the Advocate
General adopted a similar position.lO Since the Commission's deci-
sion did not "explain sufficiently why such competition between the
various brands should not have been rightly considered," it was
argued to be in violation of Article 190 of the Treaty. 1 1
grounds existed for action on its part and grant a "negative clearance." Alterna-
tively, an exemption could be granted under Article 85(3) for an agreement
which met the requirements under the provision. Finally, as in Grundig, the
Commission could order the immediate termination of any Treaty violation.
6. Decision of October 20, 1964, 7 J. O. COMM. EUR. (No. 161) 2545
(1964).
7. Article 173 provides that any "natural or legal person may ... insti-
tute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person" when the legality
of the acts of the Commission was questioned. Although this article applies to
acts of the Council as well, it does not appear that the "constitutionality" of the
delegation of power to the Commission by the Council was argued. Implicit in
the Court's support for the action of the Commission, however, are the assump-
tions that (1) Article 87 authorized the Council to delegate the enforcement re-
sponsibility and (2) the Council would not be liable for any "excesses" of the
Commission in policing under Articles 85 and 86, by virtue of that delegation.
The EEC Treaty is reprinted in 298 U.N.T.S. 14 (1958).
8. In addition to U.N.E.F. and Leissner, who intervened on behalf of
the Commission, the German and Italian Governments presented arguments for
the plaintiffs.
9. Consten v. Commission,supra note 2, at 7639.
10. Id. at 7657, 7663.
11. Id. at 7639.
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The Commission responded that the "deciding criteria for bring-
ing into play the prohibitions set forth in Article 85(1) does not de-
pend on the part of the 'relevant market' held by the products in
question"; a finding that an agreement "not only theoretically but
also perceptibly affects the freedom of action of the parties or the
position of third parties on the market" would be sufficient. 12 More-
over, the "perceptible" character of the restriction on competition in
the instant case was a result of the "special nature of the market for
Grundig products-a market characterised by a small number of com-
petitors on the producer level and by the fact that the goods are
highly specialized. ' 1 3  And in response to the argument that the
agreements in question had the actual effect of increasing trade be-
tween France and Germany, 14 the Commission took the position
that the Treaty was designed "to protect the liberalized trade in
goods against all distortions of competition. " 15
Plaintiffs further argued that Article 85(1 ) did not reach vertical
arrangements but only horizontal restraints on the market. 16 The
Italian government, intervening on behalf of the plaintiffs, proposed
that since a contract between a producer and an exclusive distributor
concerned the legal relationship between two parties and not an
"economic phenomenon," it could not be assailed under the Treaty.
To the Italian government, it was "inconceivable" that there could
be competition between licensees, since they had not been given the
legal capacity to engage in such competition. 17 The Commission,
however, did not feel a need to establish why Article 85(1) applied,
alleging that the sole criterion for its consideration was whether there
would be an "alteration of competition and trade." 18
The Advocate General's position on this point was somewhat
different than that taken by either the plaintiffs or the Commission.
Through a comparison of the Dutch, Italian and German texts of the
Treaty with the French, he came to the conclusion that the French
"affecter" should be given a negative connotation; thus, only
"effects on trade" which impaired competition in the Community
market as a whole were prohibited. 19 He also joined the plaintiffs
12. Id. at 7640.
13. Id. at 7628.
14. Id. at 7642.
15. Id. at 7643.
16. /d. at 7624.
17. Id. at 7625-26.
18. /d. at 7624.
19. Id. at7664.
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and the German government 2 0 in emphasizing the need to avoid a
per se prohibition of exclusive distribution agreements, suggesting
that the Court adopt the "rule of reason" approach employed by
American courts in antitrust analysis.21 The Commission pointed
to the existence of the exemption under Rule 85(3) for agreements
which fell within the terms of 85(1) as a significant distinction be-
tween the American and Common Market systems; the authorities of
the former had in effect been "forced to temper the manner in which
they would view the degree of change in competitive conditions.
'
"22
In view of Article 85(3), such temperance was unnecessary in the ap-
plication of Community law doctrines such as the free movement of
goods.
The final major area of disagreement between the Commission
and Grundig et aL was the applicability of Article 222 of the
Treaty 23 as a limitation on the Commission's authority under Regu-
lation 17/62. Consten's trademark rights, as "intellectual property,"
were protected from interference by Community organs under the
plaintiffs' interpretation; if there was any inconsistency between the
Treaty and municipal trademark law, it could be remedied only by
"improving and adapting the national laws in accordance with
Articles 100 and 102" of the Treaty.24 In the Commission's view,
the cartel prohibitions of the Treaty would necessarily be applicable
to laws on the protection of intellectual property. Any other con-
struction of the Treaty would leave a "way open to circumvention";
thus, "inroads" were necessary upon the authority of the Member
States to grant industrial property protection.
25
In view of the amount of interest engendered and the wealth of
arguments suggested, the facial simplicity of the Court's decision is,
at least at first, confounding. The Court determined that it was suf-
ficient for the purposes of Article 85(1) if an agreement had the ob-
ject or effect of restricting competition, including that between dis-
tributors of the same brand of products.26  Thus, an agreement
whereby one party authorizes another to register a trademark within
20. Id. at 7640.
21. Id. at 7663.
22. Id. at 7641.
23. Article 222 provides: "This Treaty shall in no way prejudice the
rules in Member states governing the system of property ownership."
24. Consten v. Commission, supra note 2, at 7631.
25. Id. at 7632-33.
26. Id. at 7652.
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a portion of the Common Market in order to prevent parallel imports
would be per se restrictive of competition. 27 The fact that the over-
all effect of such an agreement might be to increase competition
within the Market as a whole was to be disregarded; the only relevant
consideration, in the opinion of the Court, was whether the agree-
ment "directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, is capable of
jeopardizing the freedom of trade between Member States in such a
manner as to prejudice the realization of the objectives of a single
market between States." 28
With respect to the arguments under Article 222, that the
Treaty should "in no way prejudice the rules in Member States gov-
erning the system of property ownership" including municipal intel-
lectual property legislation, the Court decided that the Commission's
decision had left these rights "untouched"; only the exercise of those
rights had been limited to the extent "necessary to enforce the pro-
hibition of Article 85, paragraph 1 .-29 This distinction between the
existence of intellectual property rights and their exercise, intro-
duced by the Court in its first encounter with a problem in the trade-
mark area, provides the basis for all of the Court's subsequent analy-
ses of patent and copyright questions as well. It therefore warrants
careful scrutiny in its nascent state.
The Court did not address the method by which the existence/
exercise distinction was to be carried out in practice. In the absence
of an interpretive framework, it has been argued that such a distinc-
tion cannot be accepted as logically valid. 30 An exclusive right, such
as granted by municipal trademark law, would only exist in its exer-
cise; the mere registration of a mark, without enforcement mechan-
isms to insure exclusive use, could not be viewed as the extent of
trademark protection permitted by the Treaty. Such an approach
would exalt form over substance, and violate Article 222 in the
process.
The Court also did not address the plaintiffs' allegation of mis-
use of power, dismissed by the Commission in their brief as pre-
sented "in a manner that was too concise." 3 1 The obvious conflict
between municipal and Community law was nonetheless clearly
27. Id. at 7654.
28. Id. at 7652.
29. Id. at 7654.
30. vn Nieuwenhoven Helbach, Industrial Property, the Centrafarm
Judgements, 13 C.M.L. Rgv. 37,41 (1976).
31. Consten v. Commission, supra note 2, at 7629.
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raised by Grundig; the Commission's brief, they noted, did not "per-
mit a determination of whether the defendant denies that it intruded
itself into the field of trademark law or whether it feels that it has
that right." 32 The actual position taken by the Commission appears
to have been that the various provisions of the Treaty were not mu-
tually exclusive, perhaps in the belief that it could thereby avoid the
allocation of power issue. 33 The Court's affirmative duty to "review
the legality of acts of the Council and the Commission" would not
seem properly to have been avoided so easily. 34
The willingness of the Court to adopt its own interpretation of
the scope of intellectual property rights, and to ignore the ostensible
goals of the municipal legislation in its analysis, is one of the most
disturbing features which emerge from an evaluation of this and sub-
sequent decisions. Many of the issues raised in this case reappear in
the later cases, where at least some of them are given a less superficial
treatment. The existence/exercise distinction, apparently raised sua
sponte by the Court, is the primary legacy of the Grundig decision
and the less than solid foundation for the Court's jurisprudence.
Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel et al. 35
The American firm Parke, Davis & Co. was the holder of Dutch
patents on chemical and microbiological processes for the production
of the antibiotic chloramphenicol. The defendant companies had
purchased the drug from the Carlo Erba company in Italy, where it
could legally be produced, since pharmaceutical compositions could
not be the subject of patent protection under the Italian law. When
defendants marketed the antibiotic in Holland without permission of
the Dutch patentee, the latter brought suit in the Dutch courts for
infringement. The Gerechtshof of the Hague, pursuant to Article
177 of the Treaty, submitted two questions to the Court: (1) Could
the holder of a patent exercise his rights in one Member State to pre-
vent imports from another Member State in which no such rights
could be granted? (2) Would the answer to the first question be dif-
ferent if the licensee under the patent receives a higher price for the
product than that asked of the consumer for the product in the
32. Id. at 7632.
33. Id. at 7631.
34. Cf. note 7 supra.
35. 119681 E. Comm. Ct. j. Rep. 81, 11967-1970 Transfer Binderl
COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8054, Case 24/67.
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Member State where no protection is granted?
36
With respect to the first question, one of the defendants' argu-
ments, although rejected in the instant case, foreshadows later devel-
opments in the Court's jurisprudence. Defendants pointed out that
in some Member States the patentee's rights were deemed "ex-
hausted" after the first sale, and that subsequent sales could not be
prevented once the patented product had been put into circulation.
They argued that a product never patentable in one Member State
should be regarded a fortiori as not subject to restrictions on import
or sale in another Member State. 37
The Court decided that a patent, independent of any agreement
of which it might be the subject, would not bring Articles 85 or 86
into play. It then went on to indicate that "the utilization of one or
more patents by enterprises acting in concert ... creating a situation
likely to fall within the concepts of agreements between enterprises,
of decisions of associations of enterprises, or of concerted practices"
could warrant scrutiny under Article 85. And while "a patent of in-
vention . . . does not necessarily mean that the exercise of the rights
thus conferred implies the presence" of abusive exploitation of a
dominant position such as prohibited by Article 86, "it would be
otherwise . . . if the utilization of the patent were to deteriorate"
into such a state. 38
The Court then addressed Chapter 2 of the Treaty, relating to
the free movement of goods, for the first time in the context of intel-
lectual property rights:
Moreover, in a comparable area, Article 36 of the
Treaty, after providing that Articles 30 through 34 shall
not preclude import or export restrictions that are justi-
fied, among other things, in order to protect industrial and
commercial property, stipulates, as has already been
pointed out, that such restrictions "may not be used as a
means of arbitrary discrimination nor as a disguised re-
striction on trade between Member States." Thus, since
the existence of a patent right at present depends entirely
on domestic legislation, only the use of such right could be
subject to the rules of Community law, in the event such
use were to contribute to a dominant position whose
36. 11967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. Rep. (CCH) 8054 at
7812.
37. Id. at 7816.
38. Id. at 7825.
1979]
N.Y.J. INT'L & COMP. L.
abusive exploitation is likely to effect trade between Mem-
ber States. 39
The exercise/existence distinction of Grundig, proposed for trade-
marks, was thus made directly applicable to patents as well; more-
over, Articles 30-34 were introduced as yet another potential threat
to municipal intellectual property legislation.
The Court then answered the second question in the negative,
noting that there was "nothing to prevent the selling price of the pro-
tected product from being used as a factor in determining whether
there is an abusive exploitation . .. .40 The higher price of the pat-
ented product alone would not constitute an abuse in itself; a greater
showing than a price differential would be needed before a violation
of the Treaty would be found.
The clear implication from the Court's analysis is that the lack
of consent on the part of the patentee to the sale of the product was
determinative in the absence of an agreement or an abuse of a domi-
nant position. Rather than abandon this approach entirely, the
Court in later decisions expands this notion of "consent" beyond its
rational limit. Rather than eliminate some of the confusion arising
from the Grundig decision, the Court had thus compounded it.
Sirena S.R.L. v. Edo S.R.L. et al.41
The Court again invoked the existence/exercise distinction of
Grundig in the Sirena decision, holding that Article 85 would prevent
the exercise of trademark rights in one Member State when the same
mark was registered in another State by a different party if the rights
in both countries had been under common ownership at one time.
While the decision has attracted some interest for the Court's dispar-
agement of trademarks,4 2 its main significance lies in the introduc-
tion of yet another novel doctrine into Community intellectual prop-
erty law: the "common origin" doctrine. While the result reached
by the Court may have been justified on the facts, the ultimate devel-
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 119711 C. j. Comm. E. Rec. 69, (1971-1973 Transfer Binderl
COMM. MKT. Rep. (CCH) 8101, Case 40/70.
42. "IT] he trademark right differs from other industrial property rights
in that the things that are protected by the latter are often of greater importance
and greater value than the rights deriving from a trademark." 11971-1973
Transfer Binderl Comm. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8101 at 7111.
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opment of this doctrine serves as a prime example of the dangers of
adhoc judicial lawmaking, as will be discussed infra.
The Italian firm Sirena had acquired local rights to the trade-
mark "PREP," for use with shaving cream, from the American com-
pany Mark Allen in 1937. The German registration for the same
mark was subsequently transferred to a German firm. When an
Italian competitor began to import goods bearing the "PREP" mark
and to sell them at a much lower price than that charged by Sirena,
the latter brought suit for trademark infringement.
The Court first noted that the trademark right, "as a statutory
right, does not in itself carry the elements of contract or concert
required by Art. 85. . . *"42a Nonetheless, the exercise of that right
could come within the prohibitions "where it appears to be the
object, the means, or the result of a cartel." In particular, the
Court addressed the situation where one owner had assigned parallel
rights to several parties, thereby partitioning the market:
If the concurrent assignment to several users of a national
trademark protecting the same product results in the res-
toration of impenetrable frontiers between the Member
States, such a practice can impair trade between the
states and distort competition in the Common Market. The
situation would be otherwise if, to avoid any partitioning
of the market, the cartel agreements on the use of national
rights to the same mark were reached in such a way that
the generalized exercise of the trademark rights on the
Community level is reconciled with compliance with the
conditions of competition and the unity of the market
that is so essential to the Common Market that Article 85
protects them through the sanction of automatic nullity.
43
The Court then held that importation could not be prevented
through an invocation of a trademark right "where the owners of the
trademark acquired this mark or the right to use it under agreements
between them or agreements with third parties."
4 4
From the fact that Sirena instituted infringement proceedings,
it is clear that there was no agreement between the parties to restrain
trade under a classical cartel approach. The Court may have been
correct in assuming that it had been the assignor's intention to parti-
tion the market; however, since Mark Allen was not a party to the
42a. Id. at 7112.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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litigation, its intent would not seem relevant. Moreover, Sirena is in
effect penalized through loss of its trademark rights in Italy with re-
spect to "PREP" without there having been any showing of ma/a
fides on its part. If other assignees are free to use the mark, it can no
longer serve the purpose of indicating the origin of the goods.
In its suggestion of a "reconciliation" between the exercise of
trademark rights and the conditions of competition, moreover, the
Court sets a task not easily met under most patent or trademark sys-
tems. When intellectual property protection is granted by the State,
such protection is limited territorially. A transfer of the rights re-
ceived from one State could not purport to grant similar rights in
other jurisdictions as well. On the other hand, a grant of licenses for
all States in which rights are held would prevent the use of the mark
as an indication of local origin of the goods, as was the purpose of
"PREP" here. By deciding the case without a closer examination of
the context, the Court once again failed to perceive the complexity
of the interaction of municipal intellectual property systems with
Community law and goals; a common link in the chain of interests
would be in itself sufficient to destroy a property right lawfully ac-
quired for good consideration. While a better formulated route to
the same result might have been a laudable development in Com-
munity competition law, the Court's adopted approach was easily
susceptible to abuse in subsequent decisions45 and should be viewed
as another usurpation of the power to make Community law from
the Council and the Commission. 46
Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft m.b.H. v.
Metro-SB-Grossmarkte GmbH & Co. K.G. 47
In the Deutsche Grammophon (DG) decision, the Court ex-
tended its analysis to include copyrights as well as trademarks and
patents. DG, a German manufacturer, sold records in Germany un-
der the Polydor label. In France, its products were distributed by its
subsidiary Polydor SA. Metro, a retailer specializing in selling
records at low prices, had acquired DG recordings originally sold in
45. See notes 52-57 and accompanying text infra.
46. Under Article 164, the Court's only authority is to "ensure that in
the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed." Such a
formulation presupposes the existence of "the law" to be observed.
47. [19711 C. J. Comm. E. Rec. 487, 11971-1973 Transfer Binder]
COMM. MKT. REP. (CCHI 8106, Case 78/70.
[Vol. I
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY - E.C.J.
France by Polydor SA. When Metro sought to resell those records in
Germany at prices well below those charged by other DG distribu-
tors, DG sought an injunction in the German courts to prevent fur-
ther sales by Metro, relying on statutory protection afforded to
manufacturers of sound recordings under the municipal law.
The German court referred the following question to the Court:
Is Community law infringed if the exclusive right conferred on sound
recording manufacturers by national legislation to distribute the pro-
tected products can be used to prohibit domestic marketing of prod-
ucts that have been brought to the market in the territory of another
Member State by the manufacturer himself, or with his consent? The
Court determined that the question should be answered in the
affirmative.
Unlike the earlier cases presented to the Court, the DG litiga-
tion involved no agreement or licensing arrangement requiring scru-
tiny under Article 85. Nonetheless, the Court held that the Treaty
would be violated if DG were to exercise its rights under German law
to prevent resale in Germany of the Polydor records originally sold in
France. To reach this result, the Court relied on the Treaty pro-
visions relating to the free movement of goods, first noted in the con-
text of intellectual property law in the Probel decision.
Article 36, which provides that restrictions on the free move-
ment of goods were permissible if necessary to protect "industrial
and commercial property," would on its face have seemed to take
this matter out of the Court's jurisdiction. The Court avoided this
possible conflict as follows:
Assuming that a right akin to a copyright can be covered
by these provisions, it nevertheless follows from that
article that while the Treaty does not affect the existence
of the rights recognized by the laws of a Member State in
the matter of industrial and commercial property, the ex-
ercise of such rights can, however, be subject to the prohi-
bitions set forth in the Treaty. While Article 36 permits
prohibitions or restrictions on the free movement of goods
that are justified for reasons of industrial and commercial
property protection, it permits exceptions from this free-
dom only to the extent that they are justified in order to
safeguard rights that are the specific object of such
property .48
48. 11971-1973 Transfer Binderi COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8106 at
7192.
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While not defining what this "specific object" of intellectual prop-
erty protection would be, the Court made it clear that it would not
be the prevention of parallel imports.
Where a right akin to a copyright is invoked to pro-
hibit the sale in a Member State of products that are dis-
tributed by its holder, or with the holder's consent, in the
territory of another Member State, for the sole reason that
the distribution does not take place on the domestic terri-
tory, such prohibition, since it serves to isolate national
markets, conflicts with the essential goal of the Treaty,
which is to merge the national markets into a single mar-
ket. This goal could not be achieved if, because of the
various legal systems of the Member States, nationals of
such States were able to partition the market and bring
about arbitrary discriminations or disguised restrictions on
trade between the Member States. That is why the exer-
cise, by a producer of sound recordings, of the exclusive
right under the laws of a Member State to distribute the
protected products, in order to prohibit the sale in that
State of products that were distributed in another Member
State by the producer or with its consent, solely for the
reason that such distribution did not take place in the ter-
ritory of the first Member State, is contrary to the rules
providing for the free movement of goods within the
Common Market.4 9
Thus, regardless of the rights purportedly granted by a Member
State, once the goods have been marketed anywhere within the Com-
munity, such rights have, as a matter of Community law, been
"exhausted."
Insofar as the Court relies on Articles 30 et seq. to prevent DG
from invoking German copyright law, it must be DG's attempt at
court enforcement of the law which is a "measure having equivalent
effect" to a quantitative restriction or disguised discrimination.5 0
The exception under Article 36 would seem on its face to make the
copyright law of Germany a valid exception to the strictures of
Chapter 2 of the Treaty; the Court seems to hold that its enforce-
ment is improper only to the extent that it could be used to prohibit
49. Id.
50. Cf. Van Gerven, The Recent Case Law of the Court of justice Con-
cerning Articles 30 and 36 of the EEC Treaty, 14 C.M.L. Rev. 5, 54 (1977).
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the import of goods into one Member State lawfully marketed in
another.
If this concept of "lawful marketing" is limited to the situations
where the producer itself or parties with its consent have distributed
the goods, this constitutes a Community adoption by judicial ruling
of the principle of "exhaustion of rights" upon first sale. This does
not appqear to have been a part of the substantive law of all Member
States; 1 in any event, even if it were, it must be questioned whether
the Court was the proper organ of the Community to promulgate
such a rule. As another example of the Court's grasp extending its
constitutional reach, this decision must be condemned.
Van Zuylen Freres v. Hag A.G. 52
The extreme extension of the principles of Sirena in the Hag
case must be viewed as the Court's most flawed analysis in the area
of intellectual property. The decision, which in effect limited the ex-
ercise of trademark ri,§hts only to prevent use of a mark by one "who
lacks any legal title," 3 takes the Community law still further from
the principles which underlie the municipal systems, while at the
same time illustrating the lack of doctrinal coherence of the system
introduced by the Court in its earlier decisions.
From about 1908 Hag A.G., a German firm, was the holder of
the trademark "HAG" in Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg. The
mark was applied to decaffeinated coffee, prepared by a patented
process developed by the company. Before World War II had begun,
Hag AG had assigned its Belgian and Luxembourg rights to Cafe Hag
S.A., a wholly-owned subsidiary. During the war, the Belgian com-
pany was sequestered as enemy property and sold to the Van
Oevelen family. The trademark was eventually acquired by Van
Zuylen Freres, a trade distributor of Hag Belgium coffee. Neither
Van Zuylen nor Hag Belgium engaged in retail sales of the product
bearing the "HAG" mark. The German rights were still owned by
Hag AG; when it began to market "HAG" products in Luxembourg,
Van Zuylen brought an action against Hag AG in the Luxembourg
courts.
51. Cunningham, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EEC 115 (1975).
52. [1974-5] C. J. Comm. E. Rec. 731, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8230, Case 192/73.
53. 1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8230 at 9125.
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The exercise of a trademark right tends to contribute
to the partitioning of the markets and thus to impair the
free movement of goods between Member States, particu-
larly since-unlike other industrial and commercial prop-
erty rights-it is not subject to limitations of time. Accord-
ingly, the holder of a trademark cannot be permitted to
rely on the exclusiveness of a trademark right-which may
be the consequence of the territorial limitation of national
legislations-with a view to prohibiting the marketing in a
Member State of goods legally produced in another Mem-
ber State under an identical trademark having the same
origin.S4
Thus, the implied limitation in Sirena that an intent to partition the
market via the system of assignments would be necessary to find a
violation of the Treaty was eliminated.
With respect to the argument that trademarks primarily serve
the function of indicating the source of or origin of goods, the Court
merely noted that "information on this point to consumers can be
ensured by means other than such as would impair the free move-
ment of goods." 55 And, adhering to the "exhaustion of rights" prin-
ciple, the Court also pointed out that the case would not be different
if the goods were imported by a third party who had lawfully ac-
quired them in another Member State. 56
Since the use of the mark "HAG" to indicate the origin of de-
caffeinated coffee products in Belgium and Luxembourg was pre-
cluded by the Court's decision, the trademark lost its value to Van
Zuylen, who had lawfully acquired it in good faith and for good con-
sideration. Moreover, this deprivation occurs even though Van
Zuylen could in no way be considered as blameworthy. In the
Court's failure to weigh properly the interests of the plaintiffs, this
decision must be regarded as "unacceptable. " 57 As an illustration of
the absurdity to which the Court's doctrine could lead if adhered to,
the decision should also be recognized as a warning.
The Centrafarm Cases
In a pair of related cases, the Court effectively completed its
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at9126.
57. Id.
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expansion of Community limits on municipal protection of intellec-
tual property by describing the "specific object" of patents and
trademarks, as it had failed to do with respect to copyrights in the
DG decision. In Sterling,57a the Court issued its pronouncement on
patents; in Winthrop, 58 the Court provided an analysis which appears
inconsistent with its holding in the Hag case.
Patents in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands had been
licensed to Sterling-Winthrop Group, Ltd. and Winthrop B.V., respec-
tively, for a drug marketed under the trade name "NEG RAM." Each
company was the local owner of the trademark. Defendant Centra-
farm purchased the drug in England and sold it in the Netherlands,
thereby benefiting from the fact that the price in the United King-
dom was fixed by law well below that obtained in the Netherlands
by Winthrop B.V. in a free market. Sterling Drug Inc., owner of the
patent, brought an action in the Dutch courts for patent infringe-
ment; Winthrop BV sued for infringement of the trade name.
In responding to the similar questions submitted in both cases
by the Dutch court under Article 177, the Court began by reiterating
that derogations from the rule of free movement of goods were per-
missible only to the extent justified for the protection of the "spe-
cific object" of such property. This time, however, the Court de-
cided to explain this concept somewhat. With reference to patent,
the Court opined in Sterling:
In relation to patents, the specific subject matter of
the industrial property is the guarantee that the patentee,
to reward the creative effort of the inventor, has the
exclusive right to use an invention with a view to manu-
facturing industrial products and putting them on the
market for the first time, either directly or by granting
licenses to third parties, as well as the right to oppose
infringements.59
Similarly, in Winthrop, the Court delineated the scope of trademark
protection:
57a. Centrafarm B.V. and Adriaan de Peijper v. Sterling Drug Inc.,
[1974] C. J. Comm. E. Rec. 1147, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. Rap.
(CCH) 8246, Case 15/74 (hereinafter cited as Sterlinq).
58. Centrafarm B.V. and Adriaan de Peiiper v. Winthrop B.V., [19741
C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1183, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. Rap. (CCH)
8247, Case 16/74 (hereinafter cited as Winthrop).
59. Sterling, supra note 57a, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT.- REP.
8246 at 9151-55-9151-56.
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In relation to trademarks, the specific subject matter
of the industrial property is the guarantee that the trade-
mark owner has the exclusive right to use that trademark,
for the purpose of putting products protected by the
trademark on the market for the first time, and is therefore
intended to protect him against competitors wishing to
take advantage of the status and reputation of the trade-
mark by selling illegally products bearing that
trademark .60
In both cases, the Court then decided that neither differences in
prices resulting from government control, nor the need for a manu-
facturer to retain control over his distribution system in order to pro-
tect the public from defective goods, were sufficient to justify an ex-
ception from the general principle.
With respect to the effects of government price controls, the
Court should have recognized the serious distrotions of a "free mar-
ket" involved. In his submissions, the Advocate General dismissed
the problem, suggesting that a pharmaceutical company should
simply withdraw from the market if its prices were artificially main-
tained at too low a level. 61  In any event, the Commission argued
that the price differentials could be "explained in terms of perfectly
normal factors, such as a greater volume of sales in Great Britain and
slightly less intense competition on the Dutch market." 62  Under
either approach, it could nonetheless be the case that the particular
drug at issue was of choice in particular instances, Sterling's with-
drawal from the English market would be questionable on moral
grounds, regardless of the analytical approach taken to the matter of
economic policy. 63
Moreover, the Court in these opinions made it clear that Article
85 would not be applicable to agreements between "undertakings be-
longing to the same concern as parent company and subsidiary,"
6 4
subject to the limitation that they have the aim of establishing the
"internal allocation of tasks as between the undertakings." 6 5 Since
the Court then finds the Treaty provisions relating to the free move-
60. Winthrop, supra note 59, [1974 Transfer Binderl COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8247 at 9151-66.
61. Id. at 9151-75.
62. Id. at 9151-66.
63. Bellamy & Child, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITiON 271 (1978).
64. Sterling, supra note 57a at 9151-57.
65. Id. at 9151-58.
[Vol. I
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY - E.C.J.
ment of goods a bar to just such an "internal allocation of tasks," it
is difficult to perceive the means the Court envisages to achieve such
an end. By simultaneously exempting the parent/subsidiary relation-
ship yet preventing the fulfillment of its express purpose, the Court
has made an empty promise.
EMI v. CBS 66
In an apparent limitation of the "common origin" doctrine to
only those trademarks not wholly protected within the Common
Market, the Court in the EMI case allowed the use of a trademark
right to prohibit imports into the Community. In the process, the
shallowness of "common origin" reasoning is made more evident, al-
though its unsuitability as a means for principled decision-making is
most poignantly illustrated perhaps in Hag. The decision is nonethe-
less one of the few in which intellectual property rights are re-
spected, and thus should be viewed in that light.
The "COLUMBIA" trademark had been under common owner-
ship in both the United States and Europe prior to 1917. By a series
of transfers, the mark subsequently came to be held by CBS in the
United States and by EMI throughout the Common Market. Al-
though there was no connection between the later owners other than
their common source for rights to the mark, a principled application
of the Hag approach would seem to make only such common origin
relevant. 6 When the question was referred to the Court by tribunals
in the United Kingdom, 68 Denmark 6 9 and Germany, 70 however, the
expected ruling was not forthcoming.
Instead, the Court held that the exercise of a trademark right to
prevent the marketing of products coming from a third country did
not affect the movement of goods between Member States and thus
would not come within the provisions of the Treaty, even if such ac-
66. There were actually three separate cases, although the Court's analy-
sis is substantially the same in all three;see notes 68-70 infra.
67. In fact, CBS appeared to rely on just such an approach. See notes
72-73 and accompanying text, infra.
68. EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS United Kingdom Ltd., June 15, 1976,
119761 C. J. Comm. E. Rec. 811, 11976 Transfer Binderl COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8350, Case 51/75 (hereinafter cited as CBS United Kingdom).
69. EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS Grammophon A/S, June 15, 1976, 11976
Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. Rep. (CCH) 8351, Case 86/75.
70. EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS Schallplatten GmbH, June 15, 1976,
11976 Transfer Binderl COMM. MKT. REp. (CCH) 8352, Case 96/75.
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tions constituted "measures having an effect equivalent to a quantita-
tive restriction. " 71  The common origin of the trademark rights
would not preclude their use to prevent imports into the Community.
The straightforward approach of the Court seems to belie the
actual complexity of the factual situation presented. Defendants
argued that after division of the rights in 1917, the parties had con-
tinued to collaborate to divide the world market. Although the rele-
vant agreements had expired, 72 the exercise of EMI's rights, in de-
fendants' view, should have been prevented, since the results of a re-
strictive agreement to partition the world market continued to pro-
duce the same barriers to trade under municipal intellectual prop-
erty law. 73
The Court accepted the principle that it was not necessary for
an agreement to be in force in order that Article 85(1 ) apply, noting
that it would be sufficient that such an agreement still produce its
effects. An agreement would be given such an evaluation, however,
only if from the "behavior of the persons concerned there may be in-
ferred the existence of elements of concert and coordination peculiar
to the agreement and producing the same result as that envisaged by
the agreement." 74 This would not be the case when the "effects" do
not exceed those "flowing from the mere exercise" of national
trademark rights.
The inconsistency of this approach with the earlier Sirena and
Hag decisions should be readily apparent. In both cases, the trade-
mark owners had been precluded from the "mere exercise" of their
rights precisely because of "effects" which would "flow" from such
exercise. Moreover, legally marketed goods had previously been en-
titled to free movement once sold. While the Court was probably
correct in limiting the concept of "legally marketed" to include only
sales within a Member State, this limitation was not apparent from
its earlier decisions. Thus, the Court should have been put on notice
that there were substantial flaws in their mode of reasoning, and that
accordingly the doctrinal basis should be reconsidered. Again, the
Court failed to withdraw from its logically, as well as perhaps consti-
tutionally, insecure position.
71. CBS United Kingdom, supra note 68, 11976 Transfer Binder] COMM.
MKTr. REP. (CCH) 8350 at 7362.
72. Id. at 7343.
73. Id. at 7348.
74. Id. at 7363.
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Terrapin v. Terranova75
In another of its few decisions favorable to owners of intellec-
tual property rights, the Court decided that national standards con-
cerning the "likelihood of confusion" by consumers of similar trade-
marks would not necessarily be considered violative of the Treaty.
Nonetheless, by again complicating the Community law doctrines,
the Court may once more have limited the extent of the trademark
grant.
Registered owners in Germany of the trademarks "TERRA"
and "TERRANOVA" sought to prevent the importation from the
United Kingdom of goods bearing the lawfully registered "TERRA-
PIN" mark. The Bundesgerichtshof had considered the risk of con-
fusion on the part of consumers sufficient to conclude that sale of
"TERRAPIN" goods would constitute infringement of the German
trademarks. The "TERRAPIN" mark was applied to prefabricated
houses; the German marks were used on construction materials. The
propriety of this ruling was submitted to the Court under Article 177.
The Court concluded that "the specific objectives of industrial
and commercial property rights would be undermined" if the prohi-
bition were rejected. 76 Nonetheless, the national judge was to con-
sider "whether the exercise in a particular case of industrial and com-
mercial property rights may or may not constitute a means of arbi-
trary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade"; in particular,
the court should determine whether "the rights in question are in
fact exercised by the proprietor with the same strictness whatever
the national origin of any possible infringer." 77 If the plaintiff had
not objected to the marketing within the territory for which he had
protection of goods bearing a mark arguably as similar as the one ac-
cused as an infringement, he would presumably be estopped by his
earlier failure to protest. A novel defense in trademark infringement
actions might thus have been created, 78 apparently by accident.
75. Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie C.A. Kapferer & Co.,
June 12, 1976, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8362, Case
119/75 (hereinafter cited as Terrapin).
76. [1976 Transfer Binder] COMM MKT. REP. (CCH) 8362 at 7605.
77. Id.
78. The only obstacle to such a defense would be notice on the part of
the trademark owner of the "confusingly similar" national registration. If publi-
cation in the official government trademark journal would constitute notice
under municipal law, the defense would necessarily be valid by virtue of the
Terrapin decision.
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The Court is to be praised for its refusal to lay down rules for
deciding what amounted to "confusion" as a matter of Community
law. In rejecting the Commission's invitation to still further en-
croachments on the powers of the Member States,79 the Court for
once remained within the proper scope of the reference.
Hoffman-LaRoche & Co. A.G. v. Centrapharm Vertriebsgesellschaft
Pharmaceutischer Erzeugnisse mbH80
The most recent case before the Court again involved the action
of the "maverick" company Centrafarm. In this instance, Centra-
farm's parallel imports into Germany of Valium in 500-unit packages
were from the United Kingdom, where regulations kept the price suf-
ficiently lower than on the continent to allow for substantial resale
profits as well as the costs of repackaging into 1000-unit form. The
trademark "VALIUM" was used on the new packages without per-
mission. On reference from the Landgericht Freiburg, the Court held
that national trademark law may be used to resist marketing in a
Member State after such repackaging and use of the mark without
permission.
As in virtually every situation in which there is a deference to
domestic law, however, the Court also noted that the use of national
law could, under similar circumstances, be viewed as a "disguised re-
striction on trade." In order to initiate this type of "strict scrutiny,"
it would first be necessary to show that the trademark rights could
contribute to an artificial partitioning of the market if exercised. In
light of the earlier decisions, this would reduce to a showing that the
mark was not owned by one party for the entire market. Upon an
additional showing that repackaging does not affect product condi-
tion, prior notice to the proprietor of the mark that such repackag-
ing will take place, and some indication on the new packaging to
show who had reintroduced the goods on the market would be suffi-
cient for a Treaty violation if the trademark rights were enforced.
By thus directing the potential "infringer" on how to achieve
his ends, the Court has quite clearly shown its animus towards
holders of intellectual property rights. While nominally affirming
the trademark holder's rights, their viability would be so quickly
sapped by "approved" infringements that their "existence" would
79. Terrapin, supra note 75, at 7603.
80. 119771 C. J. Comm. E. Rec. 957, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
COMM. MKT. RErP. (CCH) 8414, Case 102/77.
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revert to a formal registration without effect. The Court has at least
remained consistent in its low evaluation of intellectual property
rights in this most recent decision.
Comments
A review of the case law of the Court in the area of intellectual
property leads one first to the conclusion that the scope of the
Court's activity was less than proper. The total avoidance of the ex-
press terms of Article 222, providing that the "rules in Member
States governing the system of property ownership" should not be
prejudiced, is difficult to justify. It must be remembered that
amendments to the Treaty are properly effected through the proced-
ure provided in Article 236. Upon consideration of the Treaty as a
whole, the judicial branch of the Communities had not been granted
such authority, nor should it be allowed to usurp it.
It is certainly arguable whether the Court's insistent invocations
of the principle of "free movement of goods" are justified in the con-
text of limitations on the exercise of intellectual property rights. If
Articles 30 through 34 can be extended to apply to the actions of
corporate entities under the rubric of municipal "measures having
equivalent effect" to quantitative restrictions on imports, one is left
with the feeling that Articles 85 and 86 have been rendered super-
fluous.81 To expect individual enterprises to abstain from measures
which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the
Treaty is to place upon them a burden not required by the Treaty in
the absence of an agreement in restraint of trade.
It can also be argued that the Court's "free movement of goods"
arguments do not take proper account of the goals of the Member
States. If one believes that the whole purpose of patent systems is to
procure the publication of information and the dissemination of
know-how, a flexible licensing system, in which the parties were free
to divide the patent monopoly among themselves, redictably would
contribute much more significantly to this goal.8' Under the rules
established by the Court, it would be much more desirable to most
enterprises to keep patents and know-how within parent-subsidiary
control; although parallel imports could not be prevented, the origi-
nal sales prices could be set by the parent to prevent disruption.
Since this concentration of technical information is precisely what a
81. Van Gerven, supra note 50, at 23-24.
82. Cunningham, supra note 51, at 135.
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patent system is intended to prevent, a divergence of views on what
should be considered "adequate" protection for intellectual property
should properly be considered outside the courtroom.
By adopting a position of "minimum protection" for intellec-
tual property, in which no further protection could be afforded than
reasonably necessary to attain the minimum level accorded in any
Member State, the Court seems determined to restrict the autonomy
of the Member States to legislate in this area. In vigorously promul-
gatings its economic theories, the Court has thus interfered to an un-
acceptable degree with the law-making process in the individual
states as well as on the Community level. The Court's ultimate
failure is, however, the lack of consistency and of logic in its applica-
tions of its "judicial legislation."
If the "specific object" of trademark rights is to grant the pro-
prietor first sales privileges, as enunciated in Winthrop, the the Hag
case was improperly decided. The reprehensibility of this decision,
moreover, is clear in light of the Court's subsequent statement in
EMI:
The requirement that [a party I must, for the purposes of
his exports to the Community, obliterate the mark on the
products concerned and perhaps apply a different mark
forms part of the permissible consequences of the protec-
tion which the national laws of each Member State afford
to the proprietor of the mark against the importation of
products from third countries bearing a similar or identical
mark. 83
Yet if the burden of "obliteration" were a permissible one to place
on imports from outside the market, why was it necessarily imper-
missible, when there was no question of a potential agreement "in re-
straint of trade"? The Court's decisions provide no principled
answer.
While the principle of "exhaustion of rights" will become a part
of the "official" law of the Common Market upon ratification of the
Luxembourg Convention, 84 the Court's earlier adoption of the prin-
ciple by judicial fiat loses none of its unconscionable character.
Since a procedure in accord with the Treaty allocations of power has
83. CBS United Kingdom, supra note 68, at 7364.
84. Decision of January 26, 1976, No. 76/76/EEC, 19 J. o. comm. EuR.
(No. L,7) 1 (1976). See Singleton, The European Patent Convention and the
Community Patent Convention, 13 INT'L LAW. 119 (1979).
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been shown to achieve the same purpose, the need for the Court to
effect amendments of national intellectual property law through de-
cisions under Article 1 77 has been shown to be nonexistent.
Finally, the lack of clarity in the Court's employment of the
concept of a "measure having equivalent effect" to a disguised re-
striction or arbitrary discrimination on trade leaves the law in a less
than orderly state. If attempts to implement provisions of municipal
law are to be viewed as "equivalent measures," Articles 30 through
34 now impose direct obligations upon individuals, in spite of their
facial applicability only to Member States.85 On the other hand, if
one accepts the Commission's argument in Sterling that judgments
given by national courts prohibiting the importation of goods consti-
tute such measures, a municipal court improperly applying the tor-
tured logic of the Court would, perhaps totally inadvertently, violate
Community law. Since the Court itself often appears to fail to
understand its own reasoning, the situation is totally perverse.
In conclusion, the Court's forays in the area of intellectual
property are at best confused and in many ways unjustifiable. While
the Community Patent Convention will at least alleviate the problem
of the Court-made doctrine of "exhaustion of rights," applying it
both on the municipal 86 and the Community 87 level, the provisions
giving the Court of justice appeal jurisdiction on some acts of the
European Patent Office88 actually increase the likelihood of further
judicial limitations on patent rights. The other forms of intellectual
property might eventually receive similar treatment. 89  Unless the
Court strives to improve the logic of its decision-making process and
abandons its doctrinaire approach, it will become increasingly more
difficult for it to command the respect necessary for its effective
functioning as an important Community organ.
85. Van Gerven, supra note 50, at 10.
86. Decision of January 26, 1976, supra note 84, art. 73.
87. Id., ar:. 32.
88. Id., art. 63
89. A similar convention on trademarks has been proposed; it would be
reasonable to suppose that copyrights will receive further attention.
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